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Abstract 
 
Many studies have examined the extent to which individuals’ probability judgments depart 
from Bayes’ theorem when revising probability estimates in the light of new information. 
Generally, these studies have not considered the implications of such departures for decisions 
involving risk. We identify when such departures will occur in two common types of decisions. 
We then report on two experiments where people were asked to revise their own prior 
probabilities of a forthcoming economic recession in the light of new information. When the 
reliability of the new information was independent of the state of nature, people tended to 
overreact to it if their prior probability was low and underreact if it was high. When it was not 
independent, they tended to display conservatism. We identify the circumstances where 
discrepancies in decisions arising from a failure to use Bayes’ theorem were  most likely to 
occur in the decision context we examined. We found that these discrepancies were relatively 
rare and, typically, were not serious.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
  
A sizeable literature has developed since the 1960s examining the extent to which people 
depart from Bayes’ theorem when they revise subjective probability estimates in the light of new 
information. The overwhelming conclusion of this research is that people’s revised estimates 
generally do not conform to Bayes’ theorem, though the nature of the discrepancies has tended to 
vary with the type of task being performed. Much of this research has tended to employ tasks 
relating to book bags and poker chips or quiz-type questions and often the prior probabilities have 
been supplied by the researcher, rather than being based on the individual’s own judgment. While 
this research has produced many insightful results relating to human cognition and biases, the 
purpose of making probability judgments is to inform decision making and this literature has 
generally not considered whether the consequences of departing from Bayes’ theorem are likely to 
be serious when decisions involving risk are being made.  
In this paper we address two questions. First, how frequently will decisions based on Bayes’ 
posterior probabilities differ from those based on ‘judgmentally-revised’ probabilities (we will 
refer to these as ‘discrepant decisions’)?  Second, when discrepant decisions are made, how serious 
will the consequences be? We consider these questions in relation to two types of decisions which 
are commonly encountered: (i) those where the decision involves identifying the most probable of 
two events, and (ii) those where a decision maker has the option of either receiving an intermediate 
payoff for certain or a risky choice which will deliver either a better or worse payoff. In both cases, 
we examine the research questions when the prior probabilities reflect the decision maker’s own 
initial beliefs about the probabilities associated with the decision.  
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Following a review of the relevant literature, we identify when decisions will be sensitive 
to departures from Bayes’ theorem. We then explore how often discrepant decisions are likely to 
occur using data from two experiments where decision makers were asked to make probability 
assessments relating to possible future economic recessions.  
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Assume that a decision maker has a prior probability p(h1) that an event h1 will occur so 
that the implicit prior probability of  the event not occurring  p(h0) is  1 - p(h1). If the decision 
maker revises his or her probabilities according to Bayes’ theorem when new information, I, about 
the state of the world is obtained the revised or posterior  probability of the event occurring will be: 
p(h1|I)   =   p(I| h1) ∙ p(h1)      (1) 
 p(I| h1) ∙ p(h1)  + p(I| h0) ∙ p(h0)      
 
Researchers, particularly economists, have often assumed in their models of  human prediction and 
decision making that people revise their prior beliefs according to (1). For example, Schnader and 
Stekler (1998) assumed that economic forecasters revise their estimates of the probabilities of 
recessions according to Bayes’ theorem when they receive new information from economic 
indicators. However, a number of alternative accounts of how people actually revise prior 
probabilities in the  light of new information can be found in the literature. Studies published in the 
1960s found that people are conservative in that they do not change their prior probabilities 
sufficiently when they receive new information when compared with the ‘normative’ posterior 
probabilities indicated by Bayes’ theorem (Edwards, 1968; Phillips and Edwards, 1966). Later 
work in areas such as law (Thompson and Schumann, 1987)
  
and accounting (Eger and Dickhaut, 
1982) has reported similar findings.   
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In contrast to the finding that people ‘overweight’ prior probabilities, some studies have 
suggested that people discount base rates and do not conform to the prior probabilities that they 
imply.  The representativeness heuristic (Kahneman and Tversky, 1973) has been used to explain 
this. The heuristic appears to be used when the new information is regarded as being more 
representative of one state of nature rather than others. If this is the case, then that state of nature is 
given a high posterior probability without reference to the prior probability. The ‘inverse’ fallacy 
where people confuse p(I| h1) with p(h1|I) provides an alternative reason why people might neglect 
prior probabilities though there has been  some debate in the literature as to whether this is distinct 
from base-rate discounting (Villejoubert and Mandel, 2002).  
It is well established that individuals use different heuristics in different decision situations 
so variations in the nature of the tasks employed in the above studies will probably account for 
these different findings (Grether, 1992). In this paper our interest is in decisions where people 
represent their initial beliefs in the form of their own prior probabilities. The Bayesian approach to 
decision making and inference is inextricably linked to subjective ‘degrees’ of belief’ and how 
these are revised when new information is available. Our focus is therefore on how a given 
subjective belief is revised, not on how an externally provided or ‘objective’ probability is revised. 
Also, we are not concerned with how the prior subjective belief is formed in the first place, though 
of course, such beliefs will vary between individuals. One of the key influences on the weight that 
is attached to the prior probability in a given task is likely to be the salience of this probability 
when compared to other information presented in the task. A prior probability will be expected to 
have greater relative salience when it is the decision maker’s own estimate. People will be 
predisposed to pay more attention to their own prior (Evans et al., 2002), especially when it has 
resulted from some deliberation and effort. Moreover, the ‘advice literature’ suggests that people 
may have an egocentric bias and attach undue confidence to their own judgments (Bonaccio and 
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Dalal, 2006). To the extent that new information (e.g. in the form of a forecast) can be regarded as 
a form of advice, it may be prone to be neglected, particularly if it is perceived to result from 
statistical analysis rather than a human ‘expert’  (Önkal et al., 2009). 
Much research has involved experiments where people were not asked to estimate or even 
directly consider a prior probability. For example, in the ‘book-bag and poker chip’ studies the 
experimenters assumed that a given prior probability applied but did not explicitly provide this 
(Mahmoud and Grether, 1995; Charness et al., 2007; Holt and Smith, 2009). In these 
circumstances it is perhaps not surprising that the prior probability will be neglected. This means 
that the discrepancies observed in these studies between the participants’ posteriors and those 
obtained through Bayes’ theorem  may be different from those that we report later. 
Another influential factor in the probability revision task is the form in which probabilistic 
information is provided to forecasters. Some research suggests that information  in a frequency 
form is more likely to be used and used more effectively than information presented as 
probabilities (e.g. “10 out of every 800 women have breast cancer at age 40” rather than “the 
probability of breast cancer for a women at age 40 is 0.0125”) (Cosmides and Tooby, 1996; 
Gigerenzer and Hoffrage, 1995; Koehler, 1996). However there is also some controversy in the 
literature about what constitutes useful frequency information and why information in this format 
is useful (see Barbey and Sloman (2007)
 
and associated commentaries). For example, Evans et al. 
(2000) found that frequency formats were not generally associated with better performance  than 
probability formats when probability information was presented in a way that also allowed 
accurate perception of the underlying set structure. In particular information on the relative 
frequency or probability of the conjunction of I|h1 and h1 (e.g., the relative frequency of occasions 
when a recession is forecast and a recession subsequently occurs) can make the Bayesian 
computations relatively simple (Barton et al. 2007). Of course, in many important real-world 
` 
situations forecasters may not have the opportunity to gather their own frequency information, 
particularly in relation to the reliability of the new information. Alternatively, their ability to recall 
this information may be limited so that they have to rely on information presented in summary 
statistics by a third party which may not be in the convenient conjunctive form. 
 
3. THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
Even though people may not adhere to Bayes’ theorem when revising their probabilities the 
results may not be substantially different from the Bayes’ posteriors (Villejoubert and Mandel, 
2002; Girotto and Gonzalez, 2001). Recently, Goodwin (2015) suggested two simple heuristics 
that people could employ to revise prior probabilities and, in most cases, obtain the same decision 
as that implied by Bayesian revision. However, it is unclear whether people naturally employ these 
heuristics and, if they do not, whether any deviations from Bayesian revision are likely to be large 
enough to be consequential when their revised probabilities are used to make decisions. Based on 
Goodwin (2015)
 
 we examine two types of decision: i) decisions that involve the identification of 
the most probable event (for brevity, we will refer to this as a Type A decision) and ii) decisions 
involving  a choice between obtaining an intermediate outcome for certain or choosing an 
alternative which will lead to either the best and worst possible outcomes with given probabilities 
(Type B decision). We use two measures to assess whether a discrepancy between an individual’s 
revised probability and the Bayes’ posterior probability is consequential: i) whether the two 
probabilities imply that different alternatives should be chosen, and ii) the utility loss resulting 
from the discrepancy. The utility loss is the difference between the expected utility of the best 
option based on the Bayes’ posterior and the ‘true’ expected utility of the option that would be 
selected using the individual’s revised probability (Barron and Barrett 1996). The ‘true’ expected 
utility of this option is calculated using the Bayes’ posterior probabilities.  
` 
 
3.1. Type A Decision 
In many situations, decision makers face a simple choice which involves identifying which is 
the most probable of two possible outcomes. This problem often occurs in forecasting when the 
forecast is to be presented without probabilistic information. For example, a weather forecaster 
may choose to forecast  rain rather than fine weather because s/he judges rain to be more likely (in 
meteorology these are often referred to as category forecasts). Similarly, in sporting events 
involving two parties, forecasts of the winner will simply be based on which of the two possible 
contenders is thought to have the highest probability of victory. This decision can be represented 
by the simple decision tree in Figure 1 where F1 and F2 are, respectively, forecasts that events E1 
and E2 will occur, and w is the probability of event E1. The decision maker’s utilities are 
displayed at the ends of the branches. These are 0 and 1 for the worst and best outcomes 
respectively. Note that this decision assumes that the utility of choosing the correct option is the 
same, irrespective of which option is chosen and the same applies to choosing the incorrect option.  
For example it assumes that an economic forecaster has the same levels of satisfaction with a 
correct forecast of a recession and a correct forecast of no recession. Let w = pB if the Bayes 
posterior probability is used to make the decision after the receipt of new information and let w = 
pE if the decision maker’s estimate of the posterior probability is used instead. As discussed by 
Goodwin (2015), the chosen alternatives will differ only if pE >0.5 when pB <0.5 or when pE <0.5 
` 
when pB >0.5. When the decisions do differ, the expected utility loss will be |2pB -1|.
 
Figure 1   
Decision tree for identifying the most probable event (Type A) 
 
3.2. Type B Decision 
Figure 2 displays a decision tree for another type of decision problem that people often face 
either as a complete decision or as part of a more complex decision structure. Here a choice has to 
be made between an option, A2, with a certain intermediate outcome and a risky alternative, A1, 
that will result in either worse or better outcomes, O1 or O2. The utilities of the alternative-outcome 
combinations are displayed at the ends of the branches and range from 0, for the worst outcome, to 
1, for the best, with 0<U<1.    The prior probability of the worst outcome O1  is x.        
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U
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Figure 2   
Decision tree for choosing between options with certain and risky outcomes (Type B) 
 
Let x = pB if the Bayesian posterior probability is used to make the decision after new 
information has been received and let x = pE if the decision maker’s estimate of the revised 
probability is used. If the decision maker’s preferences are consistent with the axioms of utility 
theory (e.g., see Goodwin and Wright,2014), s/he will be indifferent between the alternatives, A1 
and A2, when U = 1-x. Suppose that,  for a given decision  maker, U = U* and  they estimate a 
posterior probability pE. Discrepant decisions will be made if:  
pE >1-U*  when pB  <1-U* 
                or     pE <1-U*  when  pB >1-U* 
The expected utility loss of a discrepant decision will be |U*+ pB -1|. 
 
4. EXPERIMENT 1:  SYMMETRIC INDICATORS 
We will refer to new information where p(I|h1)  = 1 - p(I|ho) as a symmetric indicator. This 
implies that the reliability of the indicator is the same, irrespective of the state of nature. For 
example, this would apply if a weather forecast has the same probability of being correct whether 
it is due to rain or not rain.  The first experiment was carried out to investigate for the two types of 
decision referred to above and when an indicator is symmetric: i) the frequency with which a 
failure to adhere Bayes’ theorem will to lead to discrepant decisions, and ii) the typical 
consequences of any discrepancy.  The experiment involved participants revising their own prior 
probabilities in the light of new information as part of a decision on whether to invest in an 
overseas country.  We next give details of this experiment. 
 
4.1. Participants 
` 
Fifty-six people participated in the experiment. They consisted of 36 MBA students taking 
a statistics class at Bilkent University (Turkey) and 20 managers taking part in a forecasting 
workshop at the university. Because of incomplete sets of responses, one participant from each 
group was deleted.  Thus a total of 54 people completed the study.  The results from the two 
groups were combined because they both had experience of working in a business environment 
(means of 2.4 and 5.9 years respectively) and their overall responses were similar.
1
 
 
4.2. Procedure 
The participants were told that they had to make nine decisions. In each case, they had to decide 
whether to invest money in a construction company which was planning to carry out a major project in an 
overseas country.  They were told that the returns on their investment depended on whether the economy in 
the relevant country continued to grow or whether it would go into a recession. To help them with their 
decision, they received a brief report on the current state of the country’s economy and its immediate 
prospects, which they were told was compiled by a team of international economists. A total of 27 
economic reports were constructed. These were intended to indicate either a high, moderate or low 
probability of recession. The composite leading indicator indicated that a recession would occur 
within the next six months (I). Its reliability was either high (p(I| recession) = 0.8) or  moderate 
(p(I| recession) = 0.65), or it provided no useful diagnostic information at all (p(I| recession) = 0.5).  
If a recession occurred and the decision makers invested, they were told that they would lose 
$100,000. The payoff of investing if there was no recession was either $50,000, $100,000 or 
$200,000. The nine decisions involved reports, suggesting high, medium and low probabilities of 
                                                 
1
 The mean prior probabilities of recession for the two groups were found as 0.422 (MBA) and 0 .417 
(Managers).   The respective standard deviations were 0.081 and 0.083.  A t-test showed that the means were not 
significantly different (p=0.83). The participants’ mean posterior probabilities of recession (i.e. their mean revised 
estimates in the light of the economic reports) were 0.530 (MBA) and 0.519 (Managers) with standard deviations of  
0.095 and 0.091, respectively. A t-test also showed that the difference between these means was not significant 
(p=0.67). 
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recession, combined with leading indicators with the three levels of reliability shown above. In 
addition, the three payoffs each appeared in three decisions, which were randomly combined with 
the other two conditions. The order of the nine investment decisions was individually randomized 
for each participant. Eliciting three levels of prior probabilities allowed us to detect any variation 
in departures from Bayes theorem that might be related to the size of the priors. The use of three 
levels of payoffs created variety and made the task more realistic. In practice, it would be unusual 
for a series of nine decisions relating to different countries to have identical payoffs. A lack of 
variety might also have led to an automated response from participants.  
 
The experiment involved the following stages (a sample response form is given in Appendix 
A): 
1) The participants received a brief report on the current and likely future state of the economy for 
a hypothetical country (the language used in these reports was designed to be similar to those 
used in practice). They were told that they had been invited to invest a large sum of money in a 
construction company which is planning to carry out a major project in that country and that 
the returns on their investment would depend on whether the country’s economy continued to 
grow or whether it goes into recession. 
2) Based on the provided report they were asked for their prior probability that a recession would 
occur in this country in the next six months. 
3) The participants were then provided with the prediction of a composite leading economic 
indicator along with information on the reliability of this indicator. 
4) They were then asked for their revised (posterior) probability that there would be a recession in 
this country within the next six months. 
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5) They were asked to choose between investing and not investing in a situation where their 
return on investment depended on whether or not a recession would take place. 
6) If they decided not to invest, the participants were asked to explain why they had made this 
particular decision and what return they would have required in order to have undertaken this 
investment. 
To provide an incentive for accurate judgment, the participants were told that there were three 
prizes for those who made the ‘best’ decisions. After the experiment, the total expected payoffs of 
the decisions made by each participant was calculated (using prior probabilities of 0.7, 0.5 and 0.1 
for the high, medium and low probabilities of recession and revising these according to Bayes’ 
theorem based on the stated likelihoods). Course credits were awarded to the three participants 
who achieved the highest expected payoffs.  Of course, the participants did not know the ‘true’ 
prior probabilities, but this would be the case in a practical decision making context and the 
intention was to simulate this as far as possible. The results of stages 5 and 6 will not be reported 
here. Their purpose was twofold. First, they allowed the probabilities to be elicited as part of a 
decision process rather than as isolated values which had no subsequent application. Secondly, it 
enabled us to identify the participants who should be awarded course credits. 
 
5. RESULTS FOR EXPERIMENT 1 
5. 1. Did the Decision Makers Conform to Bayesian Revision? 
As indicated above, when the economic reports were written, they were designed to 
encourage the elicitation of three levels of prior probabilities: low, medium and high. Table 1 
shows that the manipulation was successful. A general linear model was used to apply a repeated 
measures ANOVA to the prior probabilities. The differences between the means of the priors that 
were  elicited after participants had read each type of economic report were highly significant.  
` 
 
 
 Intended prior probability   Mean elicited prior probability 
 
   Low      0.217 
             Medium     0.495 
   High      0.767 
 
 
(Main effect significant at p<0005; F2,106 = 345.0.  All pairwise differences significant  at 
p<0.0005 after Bonferroni correction) 
 
Table 1  
Relationship between intended and elicited prior probabilities 
 
We used Bayes’ theorem to calculate the posterior probabilities for each participant given 
their stated prior probabilities and the reliability of the prediction from the economic indicators. 
These probabilities were then compared with the actual revisions made by the participants 
themselves.  Table 2 shows the mean differences between the two [i.e., Mean(Participants’ 
posteriors – Bayes’ posteriors)] for the nine combinations of prior probabilities and levels of 
reliability.   A negative value indicates conservatism while a positive value indicates over-
adjustment in response to the economic index.  
 
 
    
Mean 
difference 
with Bayes’ 
posterior *   
   
Reliability of 
indicator   
Intended 
prior 0.5 0.65 0.8 
Low   0.14  0.07 0.06 
Medium  0.03 -0.02 -0.10 
High -0.06 -0.07 -0.11 
             
* A  negative value indicates conservatism 
 
Table 2 
` 
Mean differences between Bayes’ posterior probabilities of recession and posterior probabilities 
estimated by participants  
 
It can be seen that when participants’ priors were low they tended to over-revise their 
probability estimates upwards. This was especially true in the case where the index had a reliability 
of 0.5 and hence provided no useful diagnostic information and the probability should have 
remained unchanged. High prior probabilities tended to be under revised. The economic indices 
therefore seemed to make the participants more reluctant to opt for extreme probabilities.    
We developed a policy capturing model to try to understand the process used by 
participants to revise their priors. The model is intended to represent the process of an ‘average’ 
participant; clearly the revisions of individual participants will not conform exactly to this model.  
Given that that the two salient probabilities involved  in the revision process will be the 
participant’s prior and the likelihood (i.e. the reliability of the indicator) a plausible proposition is 
that people’s revisions can be modeled simply as a weighted combination of these two values. 
Similar processes have been observed in time series forecasting (Bolger and Harvey, 1993; 
Goodwin, 2005; Lawrence and O'Connor, 1992). This suggests the following model. 
              p(recession|I)   =  w0+ w1 p(recession) + w2 p(I| recession)   (2) 
where the wi are the parameters  of the model  (we would expect w0 to be zero). 
The model was fitted to the data using the method of generalized estimating equations which is 
suitable for repeated measures data (Liang and Zeger, 1986).The result is shown below with 95% 
Wald confidence limits for the parameters displayed below the model in square brackets.  
 
 p(recession|I)   = -0.017  + 0.66 p(recession) + 0.41 p(I| recession)  (3) 
         [0.57 to 0.75] [0.31 to 0.51] 
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All p-values for the parameters were less than 0.001 except for the intercept for which 
p=0.576. The point estimates of these parameters, as  shown in (3),  suggest that, on average, 
participants’ revised probabilities can be approximated by taking a weighted average of the prior 
and the likelihood  with weights of roughly 0.6 and 0.4, respectively. This model gave a better fit 
to the data than the more sophisticated belief adjustment model proposed by Hogarth and Einhorn 
(Hogarth and Einhorn 1992) when fit was measured using the Akaike Information Criterion based 
on quasi-likelihood (QIC) (Pan 2001). The QIC of the simple model was 9.745 while it was 26.881 
for the belief-adjustment model; smaller values indicate a superior fit. The simple and belief-
adjustment models were also fitted to each individual participant’s estimates using ordinary least 
squares so that parameters specific to that individual could be estimated. Again, the simpler model 
fits the data more closely. Its mean adjusted R
2
 value was 82% compared to 80% for the belief-
adjustment model (it should be noted the high adjusted R
2
 values will to some extent reflect the 
relatively small number of observations to which each individual’s model was fitted)2. Overall it 
therefore appears that the process typically used by the participants to revise their prior 
probabilities was a simple one and involved them placing their updated probability estimates 
between their prior and the supplied likelihood value. This process is very similar to the “Take-the-
Average” heuristic suggested by Goodwin (2015). Figure 3 shows, for the case where p(I|recession) 
= 0.8, how different prior probabilities of a recession would be revised according to the simple 
model and according to Bayes’ theorem.  
 
 
 
                                                 
2.
 When analysing the data for all the participants we used  the method of generalized estimating equations (GEE) 
because of the repeated measures for each participant.  This estimation method does not yield an R-squared value, but 
uses the QIC value instead. The models for each individual participant were fitted using ordinary least squares which 
does allow R-squared to be measured. 
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5.2. Consequences of Departures from Bayesian Revision 
We next investigate the consequences of departing from Bayesian revision for the two 
types of decision that were introduced earlier. The decision on whether to invest is a Type B 
decision, as it involves a choice between a risk-free option and a risky alternative.  However, 
because the probabilities were assessed separately, before the decision was made, we were also 
able to assess their potential impact on Type A decisions, which would involve determining 
whether a recession or no recession was most the most probable outcome.  
 
5.2.1. Type A decisions 
Recall that for Type A decisions which simply involve identifying the most probable event 
(see Figure 1), a discrepant decision will only occur if the Bayesian posterior probability is greater 
than 0.5 when the decision maker’s revised estimate is below 0.5 and vice versa. Consider Figure 3, 
which refers to cases where  p(I|recession) = 0.8.  Table 2 shows that the largest discrepancies from 
the Bayesian posteriors are observed for this likelihood. The horizontal line represents values 
where the revised probability is 0.5. It can be seen that participants’ revised probabilities as 
represented by the simple model (3) are only on opposite sides of this line for prior probabilities 
between 0.20 and 0.29. This suggests that if people revise their probabilities in accordance with the 
simple model, then they will make the wrong choice between the least and most probable 
outcomes relatively rarely. Consistent with this, an analysis of revisions for all participants across 
all likelihoods revealed that they would have led to the correct choice on  88.8% of occasions (this 
excludes decisions where either the pB or pE values were 0.5 so that the two events E1 and E2 
would have been judged to be equally probable).   Only 2.5% of decisions were discrepant when 
the likelihood was 0.5. For likelihoods of 0.65 and 0.8 the percentage of discrepant decisions was 
` 
13.6% and 16.5% respectively. Thus, ironically, more reliable information was associated with a 
greater tendency for a discrepant decision to occur.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3  
Probability revisions based on Bayes’ theorem and simple model when likelihood = 0.8 
 
 
 
In the recession forecasting context that we examined, the consequences of a failure to use 
Bayes’ theorem were not serious where Type A decisions are concerned. Recall that, for a Type A 
decision, the expected utility loss of a discrepant decision is |2pB -1|. Discrepant decisions had a 
mean utility loss of 0.40. However, given, that only 45 of the 486 decisions made in the 
experiment were discrepant, in the vast majority of cases the utility loss was zero. Therefore 
averaged over all these decisions the mean expected utility loss was only 0.04 (i.e., the mean loss 
was only 4% of the distance between the worst and best utilities). 
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5.2.2. Type B  decisions 
For Type B decisions (Figure 2) the frequency with which a discrepant decision will be 
made clearly depends on the decision maker’s utility (U). We therefore simulated the decisions 
that would be made by each of our participants if they used either the correct Bayes’ posteriors or 
their own revised probabilities and if their decisions were consistent with each of the following 
values of U: 0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7 and 0.9. If the payoff of A2 is halfway between the worst and best 
payoffs, these utilities will represent attitudes to risk ranging from extreme risk-seeking behavior 
(0.1) to extreme risk-aversion (0.9) while 0.5 would represent risk-neutrality. Alternatively, they 
would represent the level of attractiveness of  the payoffs of A2 to the decision maker. 
Table 3a shows the percentage of discrepant decisions for high, medium and low values of 
pB and the different utilities for A2. These tended to occur where pB was low and the utility (U) was 
high, or vice versa, and  Table 3b also shows that discrepancies tended to be more probable when 
the likelihood was 0.8 showing, as with Type A decisions, that more reliable information is 
associated with a greater probability of a discrepant decision. The overall values show what 
percentage of the 486 simulated decisions for each level of  utility (i.e. 54 participants x 9 
decisions) were discrepant.  Depending on the utility, roughly between 5% and 14% of decisions 
were discrepant with  most discrepancies occurring when the utilities did not have extreme values. 
 
  
Utility of certain payoff (U)   
Bayes posterior 
(pB) 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.9 
below 0.33 0.0 3.2 10.8 29.9 16.6 
0.33 to under 0.67 0.0 5.7 15.0 5.7 0.0 
0.67 and over 21.2 28.0 3.7 0.5 0.0 
  
    
  
Overall 8.2 13.6 9.3 11.5 5.3 
 
Table 3a  
Percentage of discrepant decisions for high, medium and low values of pB 
` 
 
 
  
Utility of certain payoff (U) 
   
Likelihood 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.9 
0.50 3.1 6.2 1.9 11.7 5.6 
0.65 3.7 16.7 11.7 9.9 6.2 
0.80 17.9 17.9 14.2 13.0 4.3 
 
Table 3b  
Percentage of discrepant decisions for different likelihoods 
 
However, the occurrence of a discrepancy does not necessarily imply serious consequences. 
The mean expected utility losses displayed in Tables 4a and 4b suggest that, on average, the 
decision makers were unlikely to lose much satisfaction by employing their judgment to revise 
their prior probabilities rather than Bayes’ theorem. For example, the worst mean expected utility 
loss occurs when the decision makers were assumed to have a utility for the payoff of A2 of 0.1 
and the Bayesian posterior probability (pB) was over 2/3. However, even this utility loss is only 12% 
of  the difference between the utilities of the worst and best possible outcomes and most of the 
other mean expected utility losses were less than 3.5% of this difference. 
    Utility of certain payoff (U)   
Bayes posterior 
(pB)   0.1    0.3    0.5    0.7    0.9 
below 0.33 0.000 0.016 0.035 0.044 0.009 
0.33 to under 0.67 0.000 0.005 0.013 0.009 0.000 
0.67 and over 0.120 0.024 0.010 0.003 0.000 
  
    
  
Overall 0.047 0.016 0.019 0.018 0.003 
 
Table 4a  
Mean utility losses for high, medium and low values of pB 
 
    
Utility of certain payoff (U) 
   
Likelihood 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.9 
0.50 0.002 0.008 0.005 0.021 0.004 
0.65 0.008 0.011 0.020 0.015 0.002 
0.80 0.077 0.028 0.031 0.017 0.003 
 
` 
Table 4b  
Mean utility losses for different likelihoods 
 
6. EXPERIMENT 2:  ASYMMETRIC INDICATORS 
We refer to an indicator as asymmetric where p(I|h1)  ≠ 1 - p(I|ho). This may be the case, for 
example, where an economic indicator is less reliable when a recession is on the way than when no 
recession will occur. Experiment 2  investigated  how people revise their prior probabilities when 
they are given an asymmetric indicator. 
 
6.1 Participants and Procedure 
 Fifty-nine final year business students taking a forecasting course at Bilkent University 
participated in the experiment. The procedure was similar to Experiment 1, though steps 5 and 6 
which required participants to make a decision on whether to invest, were omitted. Twenty-seven 
economic reports were constructed using the same countries and reports as in Experiment 1. Each 
participant estimated a prior and posterior probability of recession for 9 countries – three with 
reports suggesting a high prior probability of recession, three suggesting a medium probability and 
three suggesting a low probability.  For each country, an economic indicator was then provided 
with a level of reliability that was either p(I| recession) = 0.8, 0.65 or 0.5, as in Experiment 1. 
However, this time p(I| no recession) was either 0.1, 0.3 or 0.5 so the indicator was only symmetric 
for the (0.5, 0.5) combination.  For each country, the value of (I| no recession) was randomly 
assigned to the participants. 
 
7. RESULTS FOR EXPERIMENT 2 
7.1 Did the Decision Makers Conform to Bayesian Revision? 
` 
As in Experiment 1, the manipulation intended to encourage the elicitation of three levels of prior 
probabilities was successful, though, where the intended probability was high,  the mean elicited 
prior probability was less than in Experiment 1 (see Table 5). 
 
 Intended prior probability   Mean elicited prior probability 
 
   Low      0.196 
              Medium     0.334 
   High      0.573 
 
(Main effect significant at p<0005 F2,116 = 111.9. All pairwise differences significant at p<0.0005 
after Bonferroni correction). 
 
Table 5  
Relationship between intended and elicited prior probabilities 
 
 
As before, we used Bayes’ theorem to calculate the posterior probabilities for each 
participant, given their stated prior probabilities, and the reliability of the prediction from the 
economic indicators. These probabilities were then compared with the actual revisions made by the 
participants themselves.  Table 6 shows mean the differences between the two [i.e. 
Mean(Participants’ posteriors – Bayes’ posteriors)] for the combinations of prior probabilities and 
levels of reliability.   As before, a negative value indicates conservatism while a positive value 
indicates over-adjustment in response to the economic indicator.  
 
  
L=0.5 
  
L=0.65 
  
L=0.8 
 
 
      p(I|no recession)       p(I|no recession)       p(I|no recession) 
Intended 
Prior 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.1 0.3 0.5 
Low -0.14 -0.01 0.16 -0.22 -0.04 0.06 -0.28 -0.17 -0.07 
Med -0.30 -0.08 0.05 -0.31 -0.18 0.01 -0.29 -0.09 0.01 
High -0.31 -0.16 -0.02 -0.32 -0.11 -0.05 -0.20 0.01 0.02 
 
` 
Table 6  
Mean differences between Bayes’ posterior probabilities of recession and posterior probabilities 
estimated by participants  
 
In contrast to Experiment 1, it can be seen that the participants tended to be conservative. Rather 
than overreacting to the economic indicator they tend to underweight it, particularly when p(I| no 
recession) was 0.1. The smaller this value is then the greater the probability of a recession will be 
as there is a smaller chance of a recession being indicated when none will occur (i.e., the likelihood 
ratio in favor of a recession is greater). Thus it appears that the participants were unable or 
unwilling to use the information on (I| no recession) when revising their estimate.  As in 
Experiment 1, we used the method of generalized estimating equations to fit a linear model to the 
data, this time including p(I| no recession) as an additional independent variable. The result is 
shown below with p-values for the coefficients displayed below the model in parentheses and 95% 
Wald confidence limits for the parameters in square brackets.  
 
p(recession|I)   = 0.06  + 0.63 p(recession) + 0.16 p(I| recession) +0.07 p(I| no recession) (4) 
     (0.18)    (0.00)  (0.01)          (0.13) 
   [0.53 to 0.72]  [0.05 to 0.27]    [-0.04 to 0.17] 
The non-significant coefficient for p(I| no recession) provides further evidence that the participants 
neglected this information. Moreover, compared to the policy capturing model obtained for the 
first experiment (3), they attached a much lower weight to p(I| recession)  (0.16 versus 0.41).  Thus, 
although the weight attached to the prior probabilities is very similar for the two models (0.63 
versus 0.66), it appears that the more complex information relating to the reliability of the 
economic indicator  meant that it had less influence on the revised probabilities. It is possible that 
the participants found it difficult to comprehend why the probabilities, p(I|recession) and p(I| no 
recession) did not add up to 100% so they were less trustful of the economic indicator and 
` 
discounted it more. This is despite the fact that in most cases it provided a stronger indication that 
a recession was imminent than in the first experiment. 
 
7.2. Consequences of Departures from Bayesian Revision 
7.2.1. Type A decisions 
The participants’ revisions would have led to the correct decision on 82% of occasions 
(again this excludes decisions where either the pB or pE values were 0.5), only slightly less 
than the 88.8% rate for experiment 1. However, when p(I|no recession) was equal to 0.1 only 
58.5% of decisions were correct, reflecting participants’ inability to respond to the high 
likelihood ratio. In contrast, when this probability was equal to 0.3 or 0.5, 91.3% of decisions 
were correct. As was the case with the symmetric indicator in Experiment 1, the consequences 
of a failure to use Bayes’ theorem do not appear to be serious where Type A decisions are 
concerned, at least in the context we explored. Averaged over all 486 decisions the mean 
expected utility loss would only have been 0.07 (i.e. the mean loss was only 7% of the 
distance between the best and worst utilities). Recall that it was 0.04 when the indicator was 
symmetric. 
 
7.2.2. Type B decisions 
As before, we simulated the decisions that would be made by our participants if they used either 
the correct Bayes’ posteriors or their own revised probabilities and if their decisions were 
consistent with each of the following values of U: 0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7 and 0.9. Table 7a shows the 
percentage of discrepant decisions for high medium and low values of pB and the different values 
of U.  As before, these tended to occur where pB was low and the utility (U) was high or vice versa. 
Table 7b shows the percentage of discrepant decisions for high medium and low values of the 
` 
likelihood ratio and different values of U. As expected, given the conservatism shown by the 
participants and the neglect of the values of p(I| no recession), discrepant decisions would be more 
common the greater the value of the likelihood ratio. However, this was not the case when U is low. 
    Utility of certain payoff (U)   
Bayes posterior 
(pB) 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.9 
below 0.33 1.9 1.9 4.5 23.6 26.8 
0.33 to under 0.67 5.2 5.2 30.5 26.4 2.3 
0.67 and over 24.0 60.0 29 8.5 0.5 
  
    
  
Overall 10 24.9 22.2 18.8 8.9 
Table 7a  
Percentage of discrepant decisions for high medium and low values of pB 
 
 
    
Utility of certain payoff (U) 
   
Likelihood ratio 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.9 
<2 7.5 17.3 11.7 14.5 13.1 
2 to 3 13 20.4 16.7 15.7 8.3 
>5 14.4 34.9 35.9 24.9 4.8 
 
Table 7b  
Percentage of discrepant decisions for different likelihood ratios 
 
Tables 8a and 8b show that, as with a symmetric indicator, on average decision makers are 
unlikely to lose much satisfaction by employing their judgment to revise their prior probabilities 
rather than Bayes’ theorem. The maximum value recorded in the two tables is 0.089. However, 
even this utility loss is only 8.9% of  the difference between the utilities of the worst and best 
possible outcomes and most of the other mean expected utility losses were less than  5% of this 
difference. 
 
 
 
 
 
` 
    
Utility of certain payoff (U) 
   
Bayes posterior 
(pB) 
0.1 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.9 
below 0.33 0.000 0.008 0.014 0.026 0.015 
0.33 to under 0.67 0.008 0.010 0.027 0.046 0.006 
0.67 and over 0.013 0.080 0.089 0.042 0.003 
  
    
  
Overall 0.008 0.036 0.046 0.038 0.008 
 
Table 8a  
Mean utility losses for high medium and low values of pB 
 
 
    
Utility of certain payoff (U) 
   
Likelihood ratio 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.9 
<2 0.010 0.022 0.022 0.022 0.010 
2 to 3 0.006 0.030 0.031 0.018 0.004 
>5 0.007 0.053 0.079 0.065 0.008 
 
Table 8b  
Mean utility losses for different likelihood ratios 
 
8. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
Our study differs in  three important  aspects from those reported in earlier research into the 
extent to which  people’s revised probabilities conform to Bayes theorem. First our tasks involved 
the revision of  participants’ own subjective probabilities in the light of new information. Secondly 
the revision was set within the context of a decision. Thirdly, the consequences for decisions of  
any departures from the probabilities indicated by Bayes theorem were assessed. In general, we 
found that people tended to overreact to a symmetric indicator when their prior probability of a 
recession was low and underreact when it was high. This led to a reluctance to estimate extreme 
posterior probabilities and may have arisen because they used a heuristic that involved averaging 
their prior probability with p(I|recession). In contrast, they tended underreact to an asymmetric 
indicator and hence were conservative in their revisions. The discounting of the new information in 
` 
this case may have resulted from the more complex information about the indicator’s reliability 
which many participants may have had difficulty in absorbing. 
Despite these biases, we found  that  discrepant decisions resulting from departures from 
Bayes’ theorem were  relatively rare whether the indicator  was symmetric or asymmetric. 
Moreover, the consequences of these errors, when assessed in terms of the mean loss of utility, 
were typically far from serious. If these results could be generalized beyond the immediate context 
of  our experiments (we discuss reservations as to whether this would be the case below)  then they 
would have  a number of implications.  For example, they would suggest that models which 
attempt to predict the choices of decision makers on the assumption that they do revise their 
probabilities according to Bayes’ theorem would still be accurate even though this assumption is 
unlikely to be valid (e.g., Schnader and Stekler, 1998). Second, they would suggest that in decision 
support systems an emphasis should be placed on the elicitation of well calibrated prior 
probabilities in the first place, rather than Bayesian revision of these probabilities.  Imposing 
Bayes-revised probabilities on decision makers may be unnecessary and problematical for those  
who seek ownership of their decision processes and regard the  Bayes formula as a black box. 
 
Of course, our findings may be dependent  on the specific characteristics and context of the 
task that we employed.  It involved people revising their own prior beliefs about probabilities in 
order to make decisions that will be similar to those that they will face in their professional lives. 
Nevertheless, our experiments only allowed  us to explore the effect of indicators that were (with 
the exception of where the likelihood ratio was 1) designed to encourage prior probabilities to be 
revised upwards. In addition, setting the revision task within the context of a decision carries some 
dangers. In particular, there is evidence that forecasts can be biased by the relative attractiveness of 
potential outcomes of the decision (Weber, 1994; Fildes et al., 2009). For example, people 
` 
sometimes confuse forecasts with decisions that will subsequently be based on them and bias their 
forecasts in the direction of the most desirable outcomes (Krizan and Windschitl, 2007). The 
specific context of this experiment -forecasting recessions - may also have had a particular 
influence on the results we obtained (Holt and Smith  2009). It is likely that participants will have 
had prior beliefs about the reliability of economic indicators and it is possible that skepticism about 
the accuracy of macro-economic forecasts may have distorted their use of the supplied likelihoods. 
However, again there is no evidence that the economic indicator forecasts were ignored. Indeed, as 
we’ve seen, when people had low prior probabilities and the indicator was symmetric they tended 
to overreact to the forecasts based on the indicators.    
  
The presentation of the likelihoods as percentages is another factor that potentially limits 
the extent to which inferences can be drawn from our results. These percentages provided no direct 
information on the relative frequency of the conjunction of events (a recession occurring and a 
forecast of recession) which can help to simplify the Bayesian computations.  Also the percentages 
were presented to participants while in many situations they will be learned over time as part of an 
experiential process. However, as we argued earlier, these limitations may be typical of many real-
world situations and given that the impact of departures from Bayes’ theorem in our experiment 
were rare and inconsequential, a removal of this limitation would be expected to lead to only 
marginal reductions in the frequency of discrepant decisions. 
Finally, our task imposed a decomposition structure on the decision makers. The elicitation 
of  prior probabilities revised probabilities and the decisions to invest was achieved through 
separate questions which had to be answered sequentially. Our conclusions might not therefore be 
applicable in situations where risky decisions are made intuitively and where all information 
` 
relating to the problem is considered holistically and simultaneously rather than separately and 
serially. 
The structures of our decision were relatively simple but they are likely to be typical of 
many decisions that people encounter. Promising extensions would be to  further investigate how 
people perform  on tasks where there are  more than two possible outcomes, where the outcomes 
are measured on a continuous scale (e.g. future world temperatures) or where multiple rather than 
single sources of new information are provided (Cameron, 2005). In  addition, further work could 
usefully examine the effect of  indicators that encourage prior probabilities to be revised 
downwards (e.g. indicators that predict that a recession will not occur)  and assess the extent to 
which our findings can be generalized to other contexts beyond economic forecasting. 
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` 
APPENDIX A:  SAMPLE FORM FOR A COUNTRY 
A decision on whether to invest: Tegoland         
 
You have been invited to invest a large sum of money in a construction company which is planning to carry 
out a major project in the Asian country of Tegoland. The returns on your investment will depend on 
whether the Tego economy continues to grow or whether it goes into a recession.  
 
Given below is a brief report on the state of the Tego economy by a team of international economists: 
 
“Retail sales in Tegoland declined in most of the last 9 months as a bleaker economic outlook damped consumer demand 
according to the Bloomberg retail purchasing managers index monthly survey out today.  
 
Record oil prices have pushed up fuel costs crimping household spending. Retail sales will tumble this quarter amid 
worsening economic conditions. 
 
The global outlook is darkening by the day and Tegoland's low potential growth rate makes it particularly vulnerable......Risks 
to growth are skewed to the downside and even the chance of a recession cannot be dismissed lightly.''  
 
1. Estimate the probability that the Tegoland economy will go into a recession in the next 6 months 
 ………………………….. 
 
A composite leading economic indicator of the Tego economy has declined in the last three consecutive 
months (October to December). In the past: 
-  in years when a recession occurred the indicator had declined in  
   the previous  October November and December on 80%  of occasions 
- in years when no recession  occurred the indicator had previously  declined in  
   each of these months on 20%  of occasions 
 
2. Use this information to estimate a revised probability that the Tegoland economy will go into a recession 
in the next 6 months  ………………………….. 
 
You have to decide whether to invest the money in the construction company.   
 
 If you decide to invest and there is a recession then you will lose $100000 
 If you decide not to invest and a there is no recession you will have missed out on an opportunity to make 
a return of $100000 
 
3. Do you want to invest in the company?     Yes/No 
 
4. If your decision is NOT to invest: 
    a)  Please briefly explain why you were not prepared to invest  
…………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
……………………………………………………………………………………………… 
    b) What return would you require in order to undertake the investment? 
 
          $……………………….    
 
